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15 March 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference With Mr. Marshall, NSC Staff, re
NSCIC Working Group and PRG Projects

1. The following comments relate to an informal conference today with Andrew Marshall, Chief, Net Assessments Group, on Dr. Kissinger's staff.

2. The India/Pakistan crisis study requested by the NSCIC Working Group is underway with Curtis Jones of State as chairman of the panel. The CIA member is [redacted] and [redacted] of DIA is representing ASD/I. Mr. Marshall and Dr. Cline drafted a tentative approach from which the task group will develop a specific study proposal. 25X1

3. An evaluation of the intelligence input to NSSM 69 on Far East policy is being conducted by Lucas Fischer of OMB who has been loaned half time to Mr. Marshall for six weeks. He and Mr. Marshall plan to set up a panel of experts from various elements of the intelligence community to examine the intelligence inputs to NSSM 69 and appraise their worth.

4. Mr. Marshall plans to follow the NSSM 69 study with a similar examination of the NSSM on mutual balanced forces reduction (MPFR) and then with a study relating to a NSSM not yet selected but which will be basically political in nature.

5. After completion of the appraisal of the intelligence response to the India/Pakistan crisis of 1971, Mr. Marshall proposes to very briefly examine several of the other crisis situations which were suggested for review by [redacted] in his response to the request of the Chairman, NSCIC Working Group, for an expression of departmental needs. [redacted] list included the Egyptian-Israeli Cease-Fire, the Lamson 719 situation, the Panamanian ship seizure and the Jordanian aircraft hijacking. 25X1

6. Mr. Marshall expressed dissatisfaction with the DDI report on economic intelligence on the grounds he did not consider it responsive to the needs of the NSCIC Working Group. He felt the report confined itself too much to what OER is doing and did not describe what else is underway in other agencies and how well the needs of top level officials are being met. He is arranging for

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a conference between economic intelligence specialists from CIA, State and Defense and Mr. Hormatz who handles economic matters for Dr. Kissinger's staff.

7. Mr. Marshall also has arranged a meeting at 0930 hours on 23 March between Hal Sonnenfeldt and [] of the NSC Staff and senior intelligence analysts in the Soviet field. Mr. Sonnenfeldt is scheduled to describe his needs for intelligence concerning the USSR.

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8. Mr. Marshall agreed to provide me with memoranda on any criticism of intelligence products or other matters of interest to the PRG which arise from conferences of this nature.

9. Mr. Marshall described developments concerning the SS-9 study which he requested DDI prepare. He indicated that reactions represent a mixed picture with some critics indicating the study was a good try but missed the objectives. The problem is how to go from here on this type of analysis. Mr. Marshall has sent copies to Dr. Cline, Admiral Gaylor, General Graham of DIA, and others for review, and he said the DDI had agreed to ask these men to designate senior analysts who would attempt a similar critique on the SS-9 study. A main point of the critique will be to discuss whether, given what was tried, it would be feasible to make another attempt and what type the new study would be. One of the problems involved in the SS-9 study may have been the lack of an institutional memory in that material on Soviet rocket forces obtained prior to the mid-60s was not called up, either through the personal memory of participants in the study or the data retrieval systems. The DDI is attempting to dig out these old materials so that Mr. Marshall can examine them.

10. Much of our discussion centered around how the PRG could get itself involved in determining whether and to what extent there is a need for types of products different from those now being produced. Mr. Marshall thinks it might be profitable to experiment with the assembly of panels of experts who would review products in particular fields and be charged with discussing new lines of analysis and recommending possible new approaches. We decided to defer decision on this until we see how well the seminar on the SS-9 study comes out and also how profitable the discussion of the intelligence input to NSSM 69 is. I told Mr. Marshall I would like to attend both the SS-9 and the NSSM 69 seminars, not as an expert on either study but from the standpoint of assessing how suitable these techniques are for product improvement.

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
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11. I indicated to Mr. Marshall that Kenneth Dam of OMB had raised the matter of his being briefed on the PRG program. Mr. Marshall thought this would be a very good idea and indicated that he attempted to keep Mr. Dam generally aware of his activities, particularly as they relate to resources.

12. One final problem Mr. Marshall raised was how one might study the overload situation in the intelligence community. He is interested in measures which could assess analysts' workloads as a means of providing basis for setting priorities for the use of production time. He noted that production shops are considered a free good by clients and means of deciding on trade-offs might profitably be examined.

13. I described current studies of the PRG program.

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Chief, PRG/IC

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